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Abstract
This paper examines whether the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11th, 2001 have inﬂuenced the job prospects of Arabs in the
German labor market. Using a large, representative database of the German working
population, the attacks are treated as a natural experiment that may have caused an
exogenous shift in attitudes toward persons who are perceived to be Arabs. Evidence
from regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimates indicates that 9/11 did not
cause a severe decline in job prospects. This result is robust over a wide range of control
groups and several deﬁnitions of the sample and the observation period. Several
explanations for this result, which is in line with prior evidence from Sweden, are
oﬀered.
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11 Introduction
Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September
11th, 2001 (henceforth 9/11), numerous reports from Muslims or "Arab-looking" persons
who feel harassed, discriminated, or threatened, indicate that attitudes toward this group
may have changed. Although these reports should not be discarded lightly, empirical
evidence on this question is rather scarce.
The available evidence can be loosely ordered into two groups. The ﬁrst group mainly
consists of surveys of newspaper reports, reported (criminal) incidents and opinion survey
results, while the second and relatively small group of papers focuses on actual labor market
outcomes.
An example for the ﬁrst group of research is a series of country reports conducted on
behalf of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) between
September 11th, 2001 and the end of that year. Although not all of these reports are
available to the public, Allen and Nielsen (2002) provide a summary.
Focusing on the part related to Germany as the country of interest for this paper, their
ﬁndings may be summarized as follows. While the amount of physical attacks on persons
of "Muslim appearance" was negligible, an increase in verbal attacks as well as a changing
focus in national security measures could be noted. The last point was criticized by various
individuals and organizations as a sign of general suspicion toward the Muslim community
(Allen and Nielsen 2002: 19).1
Additionally, they conclude that generally discrimination was based mainly on the
perception of a person being Muslim rather than on the person’s true religious aﬃliation.
Their conclusion is based on the fact that abuses, when they occurred, were primarily
targeted toward women wearing headscarfs or the classical Islamic veil, the hijab, and also
toward Sikhs whose typical appearance, wearing beards and turbans, is similar to those
typically associated with Muslims (Allen and Nielsen 2002: 35-37). They also report a
rising level of general xenophobia in many parts of Europe that mainly manifested itself
in the strengthening of pre-existent prejudices (Allen and Nielsen 2002: 42). In a study
for the UK, Sheridan (2006), using a survey among British Muslims, states that 82.6% of
the respondents reported an increase in implicit racism and religious discrimination, while
76.3% reported an increase in "general discriminatory experiences".
The situation in the USA seems to have been somewhat worse, with the Arab American
Institute reporting several incidents (along with several accounts of hospitality and support
toward Arab Americans) including several cases of labor market discrimination (Arab
American Institute 2002, a summary of incidents can be found on pages 26-27). An even
larger collection of "hate crimes" and cases of discrimination can be found in a report
by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee that also reports over 800 cases of
workplace discrimination (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 2003, a number
of examples can be found on pp. 92-103).
1An example for this view is a remark by then-chairman of the central council of Muslims in Germany
(Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland), Dr. Nadeem Elyas, published on September 11th, 2002, where
he, after condemning the attacks, heavily criticizes the searching of several mosques by the police as well as
the reintroduction of the Rasterfahndung, a computer-based search procedure for possible suspects bases
on abstract criteria that was introduced in the 1970s against the left-wing terrorists of the Rote Armee
Fraktion (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland 2002).
2Although the evidence presented above seems to indicate that attitudes toward Muslims
or Arabs in general have changed in the aftermath of 9/11, one should keep in mind that
this notion is mainly based on reported incidents and opinion surveys. These may provide
qualitative evidence and stated opinions, but need not necessarily provide information
regarding actual behavior. Evidence on the latter, however, is rather scarce. Up to this
point in time, there are only two papers available that address the question, whether 9/11
has led to a change in real labor market outcomes.
Åslund and Rooth (2005), using an approach quite similar to the one pursued in this
study, provide evidence from Sweden. They focus on exits from unemployment using
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators and a large number of control groups and ﬁnd no sig-
niﬁcant drop in re-employment probabilities for persons from the Middle East compared
to natives, people from the Nordic countries and from former Yugoslavia, Western and
Eastern Europeans, Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans.
Dávila and Mora (2005) focus on wage discrimination for men from the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in the US labor market between 2000 and 2002. They
estimate classical Mincer-type earnings regressions, decompositions based on Juhn et al.
(1993), and quantile regressions for younger men between 25 and 40 years of age and a
number of nationalities (Middle Eastern Arabs, African Arabs, other Middle Eastern, and
US-born non-Hispanics). Their ﬁndings indicate that Middle Eastern Arabs experienced a
signiﬁcant decline in wages between 2000 and 2002. This decline does not only exist in the
mean wages but also over the whole income distribution and can only in negligible parts
be explained by changes in observed variables or changes in the return to the observed
variables.
This paper adds to the literature by providing ﬁrst evidence for Germany. The anal-
ysis relies on process-produced data from social security, unemployment insurance, and
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), thus avoiding the non- and
false-response problems of survey data. We treat the attacks as a natural experiment
that may have led to a change in attitudes toward persons with an Arab background
and use regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators to assess the change in re-
employment prospects of unemployed persons with an Arab background relative to several
control groups. The ﬁndings presented here are in line with the results from Åslund and
Rooth (2005), indicating that the hiring behavior of German employers seems to be rela-
tively unaﬀected by the events on September 11th, 2001.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy summarizes some
theoretical considerations regarding the possible labor market discrimination of Arabs.
Section 3 introduces the estimation strategy. The data and the collection of the estimation
sample are presented in section 4. Descriptive results are presented in section 5, while the
section 6 presents results for the initial speciﬁcation as well as some variations to check
the robustness of the results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
The question whether members of certain groups are treated diﬀerently in the labor market
has a long history in economics. In principle, there are two strands of literature. The ﬁrst,
usually known as "taste discrimination", begins with Becker (1957/1971). It typically
3models labor market discrimination as a result of preferences of employers, employees,
or customers toward or against certain groups. The second strand, labeled "statistical
discrimination", focuses on the role of group membership as a proxy for unobserved worker
characteristics. In these group of models, that started with Phelps (1972) and Arrow
(1973), employers use information on group membership to assess otherwise unobservable
diﬀerences in individual worker productivity that are more common among members of a
certain group.2
As already pointed out by Åslund and Rooth (2005), a rise in the discrimination of
Arabs could only be explained by statistical discrimination if the terrorist attacks revealed
some previously unknown characteristic of Arabs that somehow relates to the labor pro-
ductivity of that group. While it seems at least possible to treat the existence of radical
Arab terrorists as a previously unknown characteristic of the Arab working population, the
connection with labor productivity is rather vague. In general, an employer is unaﬀected
by the (possible) fact that a worker turns out to be a terrorist. Additionally, since it seems
rather unlikely that being a radical Muslim has any direct inﬂuence on labor productivity,
statistical discrimination does not seem to explain a possible rise in discrimination very
well.
A much more plausible explanation for a possible decline in labor market prospects
seems to be a change in preferences induced by the terrorist attacks and followed by a
higher amount of taste discrimination. This eﬀect could aﬀect employers as well as fellow
employees and customers who feel "uncomfortable" employing, working alongside, or being
served by persons they suspect to be terrorists. This in turn might lower the propensity
of employers to hire Arab workers, either because they do not want to act against their
own preferences, or because of a fear for negative reactions by customers or their own
employees.
3 Estimation strategy
Empirical studies on labor market discrimination typically consider either diﬀerences in
wage or income or diﬀerences in some measure of job prospects, like employment rates or
ﬂows out of unemployment, between (at least) two groups. In this study, we choose to
focus on exit from unemployment into paid, dependent employment for several reasons.
Firstly, hiring decisions by employers are relatively unaﬀected by labor market insti-
tutions. In the time span covered by this paper, employers were generally free to hire
whatever person they chose as long as a rejection was not oﬃcially substantiated by gen-
der or disability. Wages and worker dismissals on the other hand were and are heavily
inﬂuenced by collective bargaining and job protection laws, which would have to be taken
into account in any analysis of these outcomes.
Secondly, a possible rise in discrimination against Arabs could also aﬀect those persons
who switch between diﬀerent paid employments. This eﬀect, however, would be hard to
measure since there is no way to distinguish persons who refrained from switching jobs
because of a (suspected) rise in discrimination from those persons who never had the
intention to leave their current job in the ﬁrst place. Ignoring this diﬀerence would most
2For an overview on these theoretical models as well as later extensions cf. Altonji and Blank (1999).
4likely introduce some sort of selection bias into the analysis. This problem is not present
if one focuses on the unemployed – at least as long as one is willing to assume that the
unemployed have a general interest to switch into employment.
Finally, exits into self-employment are excluded for several reasons. Firstly, discrimi-
nation by employers is logically impossible here. Discrimination by fellow employees seems
at least unlikely given the relative freedom of the self-employed to choose their partners
or employees. Finally, customer discrimination, while being entirely possible, cannot be
measured with our data. Additionally, the possible eﬀect of 9/11 on the propensity to
become self-employed is ambiguous. On the one hand, (assumed) customer discrimination
may provide an obstacle for those unemployed who wish to enter self-employment. On the
other hand, a rise in labor market discrimination that lowers the probability of an exit into
dependent employment may as well raise the probability to become self-employed.
Now, turning to the event of interest, note that the terrorist attacks can be considered
as a natural experiment leading to an exogenous shift in attitudes toward Arabs. Interest in
this paper lies in the estimation of the causal (treatment) eﬀect of this intervention on the
re-employment prospects of the Arab unemployed. Note that by deﬁnition this eﬀect can
only be directed toward Arabs, who therefore constitute our treatment group. Note further
that there is a clear theoretical one-way causality between intervention and outcome and
selection out of or into the treatment group can be ruled since a person cannot elect to be
Arab.3
Given the nature of the intervention, we are only able to observe either treated or
untreated persons at any given point in time: Before September 11th, 2001 no treatment
has taken place yet, afterward all Arabs are aﬀected by the same treatment.
The simplest possible estimator for such a situation would be a comparison of the
expected outcome before and after September 11th, 2001 for the Arab subpopulation.
This equals a before-after-estimator of the form
τ = E[Y |P = 1] − E[Y |P = 0], (1)
where Y is the outcome of interest, τ is the eﬀect to be estimated, P ∈ {0,1} denotes pre-
/post-treatment-status, and we implicitly condition on the Arab subpopulation. However,
τ could only be interpreted as the causal eﬀect of 9/11 if one was willing to assume that
there was neither an eﬀect of the terrorist attacks on the whole population, nor any general
economic trend independent of 9/11.
Using a control group, like natives or non-Arab foreigners, that underlies the same
general trend, but is unaﬀected by any shifts in attitudes introduced by 9/11, one is able
to relax those highly restrictive assumptions and use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimator
of the form
τ = E[Y |P = 1,T = 1] − E[Y |P = 0,T = 1]
− (E[Y |P = 1,T = 0] − E[Y |P = 0,T = 0]), (2)
where T is 1 if a given person can be considered to be Arab and 0 otherwise. τ can be
interpreted as the causal impact of the treatment under the assumption that both groups
would have experienced the same trend in the absence of the treatment.
3As "being Arab" is not observed in the data and has to be approximated by nationality, selection out
of the treatment group is an issue. The problem and a solution are presented in section 4.
5This assumption is rather critical since it implies that diﬀerences between the two
groups are stable over time. For example, consider the case where the treatment group in
the post-treatment period has on average – and for reasons not related to 9/11 – a lower
educational level than in the pre-treatment period. If this fact leads to lower re-employment
probabilities, equation (2) would overstate the true eﬀect of 9/11.
Since the natural experiment setting ensures that both treatment status and group
aﬃliation are exogenous, equation (2) can be written in regression form as
yi = α + λ ∗ Ti + υ ∗ Pi + τ ∗ (Ti ∗ Pi) + i, (3)
where τ gives the treatment eﬀect, i indexes persons, and  is an error term uncorrelated
with T and D.
Adding a vector of covariates X to equation (3) allows us to relax the assumption of a
common trend by only having to assume a common trend over groups after observed diﬀer-
ences have been accounted for. This regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimator
takes the form
yi = α + βXi + λ ∗ Ti + υ ∗ Pi + τ(Ti ∗ Pi) + i, (4)
where X in this paper contains information on age, gender, school and post-school ed-
ucation, disability, the duration of the current unemployment episode, dummies for 33
occupations, and dummies for 12 types of regional labor market conditions based on a
cluster-analysis by Blien et al. (2004).
Finally, note that Y is binary in our case, being 1 if a person switches from unemploy-
ment to employment. We take the binary nature explicitly into account by formulating
the model
yi = 1{α + βXi + λ ∗ Ti + υ ∗ Pi + τ(Ti ∗ Pi) + i > 0}, (5)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Assuming  to be normally distributed, equation (5)
can be estimated as a probit. The probability of a switch to employment would then be
given by
Prob(Yi = 1) = Φ(α + βXi + λ ∗ Ti + υ ∗ Pi + τ(Ti ∗ Pi)), (6)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution’s cdf.
This approach introduces an additional challenge: In a Probit regression, the estimated
coeﬃcients are not equal to the marginal eﬀect of the respective variable. Although one is
able to answer questions regarding the statistical signiﬁcance and the sign of the coeﬃcient
and therefore the question, whether there is a (negative) impact of the terrorist attacks,
inference on the size of the eﬀect requires taking an additional step.
One can obtain an estimate for the average eﬀect of τ in the sample at hand by esti-
mating equation (6), predicting the re-employment probabilities for all observations in the
sample, average over group-period combinations, and calculate
τavg = ¯ YP=1,T=1 − ¯ YP=0,T=1
− (¯ YP=1,T=0 − ¯ YP=0,T=0), (7)
where τavg is the marginal eﬀect in the sample and ¯ Y is the average of the predicted
probability in the respective group-period-combination.
6The variance of τavg can then obtained by bootstrapping the procedure outlined above
with a large number of replications.4 This procedure gives a distribution of diﬀerent values
of τavg, whose variance can be used as an estimate for the variance of τ thus making it
possible to obtain conﬁdence bounds or statistical signiﬁcances. Note that this approach
does not provide any additional information in case of insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients since in this
situation neither coeﬃcient nor marginal eﬀect can be considered diﬀerent from zero on
statistical grounds.
4 Data and sampling procedure
This paper uses data from the IEB (Integrierte Erwerbsbiographien), which contains process-
produced data from social security, unemployment insurance, participation in active labor
market programs, and unemployment registrations. Included are labor market spells for
all workers, employees, trainees, and apprentices covered by social security. While the
IEB itself is not available to the public, a 2.2% sample, the so called IEBS, can be ac-
cessed by researchers via the research data center (Forschungsdatenzentrum, FDZ) of the
Federal Employment Agency.5 Up to today, full documentation of the data is only avail-
able in German (cf. Hummel et al. 2005). A short English description can be found in
Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007).
The IEBS, which is used in this paper, covers 17,049,987 periods of employment, un-
employment, and participation in active labor market programs for 1,370,031 individu-
als. Employment data is gathered for the years 1990-2003 (West) and 1993-2003 (East)
from mandatory notiﬁcations to social security by the employers and collected in the BeH
(Beschäftigtenhistorik). Employers are legally required to deliver an annual report for each
worker employed on December 31st of each year as well as notiﬁcations at the beginning
and end of every employment.
Information on participation in active labor market programs is contained in the MTG
(Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank). This data is collected from the Federal Em-
ployment Agency’s own records and covers the years 2000-2004.
In addition, the IEBS provides information on unemployment periods from two data
sources. The LeH (Leistungsempfängerhistorik) covers all periods where unemployment
beneﬁts were received and is collected from payment informations from the Federal Em-
ployment Agency. The second source is the BewA (Meldungen aus dem Bewerberangebot),
that covers all periods where a person was registered as unemployed (regardless whether
unemployment beneﬁts were received). The data is collected by the local labor agency and
is primarily used for the placement of the unemployed. The LeH covers the years 1990-2003
for West and 1993-2003 for East Germany, while the BewA-information is available from
2000 to 2004.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, this paper focuses on the re-employment
prospects of the unemployed. For the forthcoming calculations, we will mainly focus on
4Running this procedure for one control and all treatment groups with 1000 replications takes about
eight days to run in the research data center of the Federal Employment Agency. A much larger number
of replications is not possible due to restrictions in computer time.
5Information regarding the research data center, the available data sets, and access restrictions can be
obtained via http://fdz.iab.de. An English version of this site should be available in the ﬁrst quarter of
2007.
7the information contained in the BewA. Firstly, since every period of unemployment ben-
eﬁt receival has to accompanied by an unemployment registration but not vice versa, the
BewA covers (at least in principle) every episode contained in the LeH. Additionally, it
also covers those individuals who are unemployed but do not receive any unemployment
beneﬁts. The shorter period of time covered by the BewA provides no problem for this
analysis since information is available for almost two years prior and more than three years
after September 11th, 2001. Finally, the BewA oﬀers a reasonably simple, yet accurate
way to construct the outcome variable, since it provides information on the reason for the
end of the respective unemployment period.
Using this dataset has several advantages in the context of the analysis conducted here.
Firstly, since the data was produced and collected during administrative processes, the risk
of strategic response behavior or non-response resulting in selective samples is eliminated.
Secondly, data is accurate to the day thus allowing a sharp distinction between the pre- and
post-9/11-period. Finally, the IEBS is a true random sample from the German working
population covered by social security, implying that inference on the German population
is possible without invoking any weighting schemes.
However, several drawbacks when using the IEBS should be mentioned. Firstly, the
database contains only information which is commonly reported in social insurance, active
labor market programs, and during periods of unemployment or receival of unemployment
beneﬁts. However, since this includes most labor market-relevant characteristics like age,
gender, nationality, education, regional characteristics, and occupations, this restriction is
not severe for the scope of this paper.
Unfortunately, data quality varies greatly between those variables actually necessary for
the administrative process and those collected purely for statistical purposes, which results
in some oddities in the data. This fact presents a more serious threat to our analysis since
nationality, which will be used as an approximation to "Arab background", is one of those
purely statistical variables. To overcome the oddities in this variable, several cleansing
procedures were applied that are documented in the appendix.
After these cleansing procedures several treatment and control groups based on the
observed nationalities in the respective unemployment spell were deﬁned (see table 1 for a
full list). The ﬁrst deﬁnition of the treatment group includes all persons with a nationality
from a Middle Eastern country as well as those from countries commonly considered "Mus-
lim", e.g. Pakistan or Afghanistan but excludes any Turks. This group will henceforth be
referred to as the "narrow" treatment group.
However, Turks are considered in a "broad" deﬁnition of the treatment group, which
also includes all countries from the narrow deﬁnition. This separate treatment of the
Turkish population seems reasonable since there has been a rather large Turkish community
in Germany since the massive work immigration of the 1960s. Given the relative size and
the long time of residence of this particular group, it seems possible that there are some
unobserved diﬀerences between them and other Muslim or Arab groups. These deﬁnitions
based on the respective observed nationality will henceforth be labeled "nationality concept
1".
Additionally, one has to ensure that no selection out of the treatment group occurs.
While a person cannot elect to be "Arab", nationality can be inﬂuenced through natural-
ization. One might, for example, consider a situation where individuals feel that they are
8discriminated because of their nationality. Such a situation could create a strong incen-
tive to become German. Since it seems likely that naturalized individuals still share some
aspects of non-naturalized individuals, e.g. outer appearance, continued discrimination
remains possible. This, however, could invalidate the results of our analysis by rendering
the treatment – at least to some extent – endogenous. While it may be suspected that
such behavior would be small in numbers since naturalization is heavily regulated in Ger-
many, we account for this possibility by using an alternative deﬁnition of nationality. This
deﬁnition ("nationality concept 2") focuses on the entire observed period from 1990-2003:
Persons are treated as Arabs if they have ever been recorded to posses an Arab nationality
as deﬁned in Table 1.
Table 1: Countries in treatment/control-groups
Group Countries
Treatment Groups
Arabs (narrow) Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arabs (broad) Arabs (narrow) + Turkey
Control Groups
Germans Germany
Core Europe Andorra, Austria Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Iceland,
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland
East Europe Belarus, Bulgaria, (former) Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia,
(former) Soviet Union, Ukraine
South Europe Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain
South-East Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
Southern Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic), Côte
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Saint Helena and Ascension, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
South America Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and The
Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela
As the choice of the control group directly inﬂuences the plausibility of the common
trend assumption necessary in diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimations, it is crucial for the
validity of the results. In this paper, the inﬂuence of this choice is evaluated by using a
number of diﬀerent control groups. The included groups are Germans (native workers),
North and Central Europeans, South Europeans, East Europeans, South-East Europeans
(mostly Balkan countries), South American and, individuals from Southern Africa. The
control groups are formed according to the nationality concepts outlined above. Concept
91 is again based on the observed nationality in the respective unemployment spell, while
in concept 2 all groups are formed by considering the period 1990-2003. In this concept,
persons are considered to belong in one of the groups if they have ever been recorded as
possessing the respective nationality. However, there is one exception: To avoid problems
with naturalized foreigners, persons are only considered to be German if they have been
constantly recorded as Germans throughout the entire observed time span.
Pre- and post-treatment groups are deﬁned by a ﬂow-sampling procedure to assure
independence of the two groups. Note that using a stock sampling scheme could introduce
selection bias. Consider the case, where stocks of persons, e.g. all those who are unem-
ployed at a given date, are sampled. This would result in a situation where all persons who
could not ﬁnd a job during the pre-treatment period would automatically end up in the
post-treatment period. Since it is not unlikely that those persons have a lower propensity
to leave unemployment due to some unobservable factors, systematic but unobserved dif-
ferences between the two groups might arise. Flow sampling procedures avoid this problem
and allow the groups to be treated independently.
The pre-treatment group is formed by those persons entering unemployment between
January 1st, 2000, the date the ﬁrst BewA-spells are observed in the data, and September
10th, 2001, while the post-treatment groups consists of all individuals entering unemploy-
ment between September 11th, 2001 and March 10th, 2004, the latter being one day before
the terrorist bombing of several trains in Madrid. Note that in this set-up, the duration
of the current unemployment period has to be included in the estimation to account for
the fact that persons entering unemployment to the end of the observation period have far
less time to become employed than those entering earlier.
Further control variables include gender, age, and two dummy variables for diﬀerent
degrees of disability, where age is measured at the beginning of the unemployment episode.
The dummies for disability are formed in line with German disability law that distinguishes
those with a degree of disability between 30% and below 50% and those with a degree of
disability above 50% from the rest of the population. School and post school education is
measured by several dummies for having completed higher secondary schooling (Abitur),
not having completed any post-school training, and having completed university stud-
ies. Base alternatives are given by having completed up to medium secondary schooling
(Realschule and below) and having completed vocational training, which is a common
educational combination in Germany. Persons with a foreign degree are sorted into the
German categories by the labor agency.
Additionally, 33 dummies for diﬀerent occupations are included. These are based on
the so called Berufsbereiche (ﬁelds of occupations) that group similar occupations. Finally,
dummy variables for regional labor market conditions are included. These are based on an
analysis by Blien et al. (2004) that clustered regions (Arbeitsagenturbezirke) with similar
labor market conditions.
5 Descriptive Results
Table 2 presents some basic descriptive results for the variables in the estimation sample.
Focusing on the diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups, one should note that
the share of Arabs who are men or have received no post-school training is much higher
10than in the other groups. Unemployment duration also tends to be higher for this group,
which may be related to the aforementioned lack of post-school education. Looking at the
outcome of interest, one notices that there is some variation between the groups with the
treatment groups having the lowest share of exits into employment.
Additionally, two further facts should be noted. Firstly, there are only very few aca-
demics in the estimation sample, while the share of those with no post-school training
varies between 40% and 65%. Since the risk to become unemployed tends to be lower
for those with a higher education, this can be explained by the sampling procedure that
focuses on the unemployed.
Secondly the much larger share of those with a degree of disability of 50% and higher
compared to those with a degree of disability between 30% and below 50% may be explained
by institutional settings. German disability law grants a number of beneﬁts to those with
a degree of disability greater than 50%.6 Since disability has to be proven by a voluntary
medical examination, incentives to take such an examination are higher for those who may
receive such beneﬁts and therefore for those with a higher degree of disability. Additionally,
one can imagine that labor market prospects tend to be worse with a higher degree of
disability, thus resulting in a higher probability to be unemployed.
Turning to raw diﬀerences in the outcome of interest as depicted in table 3, one can
see a slight drop in re-employment prospects for the narrowly deﬁned Arab group while
the broadly deﬁned group experienced a rise in re-employment prospects. However, this
rise was lower than that experienced by natives and several other control groups, therefore
indicating a relative drop in re-employment prospects. One should note, however, that
this picture is not particularly clear since re-employment prospects in some control groups
also dropped after 9/11. Additionally, this eﬀect could be due to some changes in group
compositions that cannot be controlled for in a univariate analysis.
To conclude, there seem to be some hints pointing toward a decline in re-employment
prospects of Arabs after 9/11. However, the picture is not as clear as one might have
expected a priori. In the following section more elaborate econometric techniques are used
to assess whether there are confounding factors, like changing group compositions, that
disguise a possible negative eﬀect.
6 Results
Following the procedure outlined in the beginning of this paper, 28 Probit regressions
(four treatment groups contrasted with seven control groups) were calculated.7 The full
set of estimation results can be found in tables 8 to 14 in the appendix. Note that almost
all coeﬃcients of the control variables have the expected signs and are usually statistical
signiﬁcant at a conventional level.
Table 4 presents the results for the parameters of interest in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-
estimations. In almost all speciﬁcations Arabs tend to have a lower re-employment proba-
6Under some circumstances obtaining the same beneﬁts is possible for those with a degree of disability
between 30% and 50%. This, however, is only possible if the persons would be unable to ﬁnd work if
beneﬁts were not granted (cf. § 2 SGB IX).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14bility than the respective control group. Additionally, a positive eﬀect of the period after
September 11th, 2001 can be found. This is most likely not directly attributable to the
aftermath of 9/11 but rather a general macroeconomic eﬀect. Now, focusing on the Arab-
period-interaction as the most interesting parameter for this analysis, one may note that
the respective coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant in all but one speciﬁcation. This indicates that
there is no decline in re-employment prospects for Arabs in the German labor market that
is caused by the 9/11-attacks.
Additionally, several variations of the sample deﬁnition or the observation time have
been used to assess the robustness of this result. Table 5 presents the results for the
parameters of interest when the estimation sample is varied. The full set of coeﬃcients
for the diﬀerent estimations can be found in tables 15 to 17 in the appendix. Since no
substantial diﬀerences between diﬀerent control groups could be found, these results were
calculated using only Germans as the control group.
Firstly, as the situation of foreigners as well as the general labor market situation
is diﬀerent between East and West Germany, all estimations were repeated using only
persons living in East and West Germany respectively. As can be seen from the results,
the parameters of interest do not change very much. Although there are some changes
in the point estimates, including some changes in the direction of the coeﬃcients, the
interaction terms measuring the impact of the 9/11-attacks remain insigniﬁcant on all
conventional levels.
Secondly, since most of the persons involved in the 9/11-attacks were men, it seems
possible that an attitude shift is only directed toward Arab men. Therefore all calcula-
tions were repeated using only the male part of the estimation sample. The results are
qualitatively similar to the East-West-estimates: Although there is some variation in the
parameter estimates, the parameters of interest generally do not change very much. In
particular, the interaction terms remain insigniﬁcant, conﬁrming our results that 9/11 did
not inﬂuence the re-employment probabilities of Arabs.
Finally, it seems possible that a change in attitude may solely be directed toward young
Arab men, since all of the (direct) participants in the 9/11-attacks were under the age of
40.8 However, estimates with a reduced sample including only men under 35 years of age
conﬁrm our previous results.
In addition to these sample variations, diﬀerent observation periods are considered.
While the main part of this paper considers the long run eﬀects of 9/11 and looks at a
period from January 1st, 2000 to March 10th, 2004, this part focuses on possible short run
eﬀects. Since it seems possible that 9/11 caused only a temporary shift in attitudes that
declined over time, the periods 9/11 +/- 180 days and 9/11 +/- 365 days are considered.
Table 6 shows the parameters of interest. For the full set of results, see tables 18 and 19 in
the appendix. As one can see, the parameters of interest do not change very much, again
conﬁrming our previous results.
To conclude, the main result of this paper, that a possible shift in attitudes following
9/11 did not inﬂuence the re-employment prospects of Arabs in the German labor market,
seems fairly robust. It does not only hold for our initial speciﬁcation but also over a wide
range of diﬀerent sample, observation period, and treatment and control groups deﬁnitions.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Table 6: Robustness checks: Time variation, param-
eters of interest, Arabs vs. Germans, see
appendix for full results
9/11 +/- 180 days 9/11 +/- 365 days





Interaction Arab Post-9/11 .0528074 -.0391454
(0.746) (0.659)





Interaction Arab Post-9/11 .0945181 .0202493
(0.201) (0.616)





Interaction Arab Post-9/11 .0632985 -.0460141
(0.621) (0.515)





Interaction Arab Post-9/11 .0886659 .0381048
(0.159) (0.268)
7 Conclusion
This paper deals with the question whether job prospects of Arabs in the German labor
market were harmed by the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Given numerous
anecdotal evidence on discrimination or – more generally – on a shift in attitudes toward
Arabs, a decline in job prospects in the aftermath of 9/11 seemed possible. We used
process-produced labor market data from social security and unemployment insurance
and regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators to assess whether 9/11 had a
negative impact on the probability for Arab unemployed to enter into paid, dependent
employment.
Our results indicate that the job prospects of Arabs in the German labor market have
not been harmed by the terrorist attacks. This result is robust over a wide range of diﬀerent
treatment and control group deﬁnitions. Additionally, it also continues to hold when we
consider East and West Germany separately, restrict the sample to men and men under 35
years to mimic the characteristics of the 9/11-terrorists, and consider diﬀerent observation
periods to capture eventual short-run eﬀects.
17While this result may seem somewhat counterintuitive given the anecdotal evidence
mentioned an the beginning of this text and also contradicts the available evidence from
the USA by Dávila and Mora (2005), it is perfectly in line with the Swedish results by
Åslund and Rooth (2005). A reason for this result, however, is not easily deduced from the
empirical evidence. It may be the case that attitudes, at least in Europe, did not change
very much. Although this result would certainly shed a positive light on the European
population’s ability to distinguish between a group of radicals and a whole population
group, it would also mean discarding all anecdotal evidence.
Other explanations, also mentioned by Åslund and Rooth (2005) in the conclusions
to their paper, may be that employers act rationally in their hiring behavior or that dis-
crimination is based on some deeper preferences that remain unaﬀected by singular events
like 9/11. In the ﬁrst case, one would have to conclude that most of the discrimination
observed in the labor market is due to statistical discrimination, on which the terrorist
attacks should have had no large impact. The second case seems possible, although it re-
mains unclear, what these deeper preferences should reﬂect, given their relative inﬂexibility
to an event like 9/11.
An interesting question regarding possible diﬀerences between Europe and the much
more involved USA emerges. Although one should be cautious about inferring fundamental
diﬀerences from the results of just three studies, it may be possible that the reaction in
the USA was heavier because of the direct involvement in the attacks and the subsequent
"war on terror", while Europe, not being a direct target, remained more calmly.
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19A Data cleansing
This appendix describes the data problems regarding the nationality variable as well as the
cleansing procedures adopted. As already pointed out in section 4, the data is originally
not gathered for scientiﬁc purposes but generated in administrative processes. As a result,
data reliability is very good when variables are needed by the administration. Examples
for those variables include year of birth, which is derived from the social security number,
and wage informations, which are needed for the calculation of unemployment beneﬁts and
contributions to social security.
A large amount of variables, however, is collected for statistical purposes and has no
direct relevance for the administrative process that generates the data. This fact leads to
some variation in data quality, depending on the speciﬁc situation in the respective ﬁrm or
labor agency, and some inconsistencies over time. A prominent example for such a variable
is – unfortunately – the nationality variable on which this analysis is based.
There are some known or suspected problems with this variable depending on the
respective data source. Brieﬂy summarized these are:
1. Employers generally tend to collect the nationality information at the beginning
of the employment and are known to be fairly ignorant toward later changes, e.g.
naturalization of foreign workers. This leads to a situation where nationality changes
are observed with some delay and to a large extent only when a worker changes ﬁrms.
2. Episodes from the LeH (receival of unemployment beneﬁts) are often not accompa-
nied by a personal contact between the labor agency employee responsible for ﬁlling
out the data sheet and the respective unemployed individual. This fact makes it
seem likely that either mistakes from earlier periods are carried onward without cor-
rection or that nationality is left blank if it is unknown to the respective labor agency
employee.
3. In general, participation in active labor market programs as well as unemployment
registrations are accompanied by some personal contact between the respective in-
dividual and the person that is responsible for gathering the data. However, even
information from these sources cannot be considered bullet-proof since collection of
this information is known to vary regionally as well as with the stress level of the re-
spective labor agency employee. However, one might assume that the main problem
with these data sources is missing data rather than wrong informations.
To overcome these problems a number of cleansing procedures based on the needs for
this analysis as well as on some assumptions was applied:
1. Since changes between nationalities that end up in the same treatment or control
group are unimportant for the scope of this analysis, the nationalities found in the
data were aggregated as shown in Table 1. This eliminates some of the changes
that were caused by changes in the political landscape, e.g. the break-up of former
Yugoslavia.
2. If information from diﬀerent data sources was available for the same period of time,
e.g. an LeH-spell as well as a BewA-spell for periods of unemployment where unem-
ployment beneﬁts were received, this information has been used as follows:
20(a) Missing values were replaced by the values from a parallel spell if there was only
one nationality observed during the same period.
(b) In case diﬀerent nationalities were observed during the same period, all were set
to missing.
3. Finally, for those cases where only one nationality and missing values were observed
over the whole period 1990-2004, the missing values were replaced by that nationality.
Table 7 shows the frequency of nationality changes before and after data cleaning. As
one can see, most of the cases with a very high-number of changes could be resolved. Since
the remaining cases still include changes to and from missing values, the remaining number
of changes seems plausible.
21Table 7: Frequency of nationality changes before/after cleaning
No. of changes before cleaning after cleaning
cases percent cum. percent cases percent cum. percent
0 1,214,758 88.67 88.67 1,306,164 95.34 95.34
1 37,511 2.74 91.40 42,331 3.09 98.43
2 41,422 3.02 94.43 18,332 1.34 99.77
3 8,473 0.62 95.05 2,977 0.22 99.98
4 23,976 1.75 96.80 219 0.02 100.00
5 3,565 0.26 97.06 7 0.00 100.00
6 11,842 0.86 97.92 1 0.00 100.00
7 2,112 0.15 98.08
8 6,756 0.49 98.57
9 1,365 0.10 98.67
10 4,114 0.30 98.97
11 997 0.07 99.04
12 2,671 0.19 99.24
13 741 0.05 99.29
14 1,926 0.14 99.43
15 579 0.04 99.47
16 1,273 0.09 99.57
17 431 0.03 99.60
18 942 0.07 99.67
19 362 0.03 99.69
20 672 0.05 99.74
21 284 0.02 99.76
22 475 0.03 99.80
23 216 0.02 99.81
24 355 0.03 99.84
25 179 0.01 99.85
26 289 0.02 99.87
27 175 0.01 99.89
28 209 0.02 99.90
29 124 0.01 99.91
30 139 0.01 99.92
31 90 0.01 99.93
32 124 0.01 99.94
33 78 0.01 99.94
34 85 0.01 99.95
35 63 0.00 99.95
36 71 0.01 99.96
37 60 0.00 99.96
38 61 0.00 99.97
39 55 0.00 99.97
40 47 0.00 99.97
41 31 0.00 99.98
42 29 0.00 99.98
43 14 0.00 99.98
44 21 0.00 99.98
45 17 0.00 99.98
46 24 0.00 99.98
47 12 0.00 99.98
48 18 0.00 99.99
49 13 0.00 99.99
50 19 0.00 99.99
51 3 0.00 99.99
52 8 0.00 99.99
53 8 0.00 99.99
54 10 0.00 99.99
55 5 0.00 99.99
56 1 20.00 99.99
57 5 0.00 99.99
22B Tables
Table 8: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Germans, Pro-
bit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.0084253 -.0083715 -.0084605 -.0083557
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) -.0243986 -.0170842 -.0250816 -.0153435
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) -.3121542 -.3124879 -.3060346 -.3056609
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.4741382 -.4738802 -.4772588 -.4731684
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0027598 -.0027449 -.0027532 -.002732
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) -.0684552 -.0665639 -.0701289 -.0660582
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No post-school training (1=yes) -.1098315 -.1046725 -.1087595 -.1022653
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) .0418082 .0407939 .0426963 .0387481
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
Arab (1=yes) -.1101522 -.2237069 -.1012577 -.209001
(0.012) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0988186 .0982592 .0997116 .0989274
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.063031 -.0202092 -.0568243 .0040293
(0.255) (0.423) (0.192) (0.851)
Constant .3723822 .3673885 .370345 .3656554
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 377325 389791 368841 385946
Pseudo-R
2 0.1176 0.1179 0.1174 0.1175
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
23Table 9: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Central Euro-
peans, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.004164 -.0089556 -0.0042544 -0.0078265
(0.043) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .1000392 .1923089 0.1122158 0.1725184
(0.058) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) .2201833 -.1959514 -0.0524384 -0.2292275
(0.569) (0.384) (0.851) (0.172)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.1235562 -.363009 -0.1388719 -0.2761011
(0.431) (0.000) (0.196) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.002413 -.002341 -0.0024513 -.0023491
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) .0257018 .0803175 -0.0345097 .0434894
(0.706) (0.134) (0.550) (0.329)
No post-school training (1=yes) .1407412 .0922054 0.0716866 .0581584
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Academic Training (1=yes) -.2425005 -.2657968 -.2166386 -.2493097
(0.029) (0.006) (0.019) (0.001)
Arab (1=yes) -.1585167 -.2899607 -.2739149 -.3990155
(0.024) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0286626 .0248081 .0300796 .0226198
(0.638) (0.682) (0.530) (0.638)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.0123022 .0343179 -.0011783 .0666333
(0.881) (0.599) (0.985) (0.203)
Constant -.3783432 .0989423 -.0663648 .2872662
(0.036) (0.329) (0.636) (0.000)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 5197 17663 8338 25369
Pseudo-R
2 0.1137 0.1061 0.1276 0.1103
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
24Table 10: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. South Euro-
peans, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.0028776 -.0070499 -.0030907 -.0065953
(0.041) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .0641705 .1502888 .089997 .1525856
(0.079) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) -.9702856 -.5561056 -1.042206 -.4507992
(0.056) (0.026) (0.033) (0.017)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.8271594 -.596617 -.7082709 -.4965218
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0022395 -.0022759 -.002178 -.0022465
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) .0935635 .1246829 .0053378 .07506
(0.172) (0.020) (0.928) (0.095)
No post-school training (1=yes) .1186555 .098854 .0723155 .0651346
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) -.0266511 -.0532304 -.0150898 -.0779678
(0.827) (0.610) (0.880) (0.346)
Arab (1=yes) .0446635 -.0777085 .0295209 -.0793732
(0.399) (0.027) (0.499) (0.011)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0867898 .0929132 .1014725 .1024361
(0.015) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.0772431 -.0400036 -.0914892 -.0200533
(0.232) (0.352) (0.085) (0.599)
Constant -.4351977 -.133023 -.3501376 -.0820444
(0.001) (0.110) 0.001) (0.238)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 9955 22430 13399 30317
Pseudo-R
2 0.0925 0.0974 0.0927 0.1175
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0960
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
25Table 11: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. East Euro-
peans, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) .0006039 -.0072595 -.0028652 -.0066863
(0.763) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .1547967 .2046643 .162307 .1937545
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) (dropped) -.3073454 -.5914793 -.3881332
– (0.256) (0.072) (0.031)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.193186 -.410188 -.3270469 -.3454479
(0.274) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.002524 -.0023808 -.0024323 -.0023688
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) -.0441043 .0263969 -.0657685 .0046741
(0.482) (0.600) (0.184) (0.908)
No post-school training (1=yes) .1478391 .098616 .0774729 .0615499
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001)
Academic Training (1=yes) -.1630378 -.183683 .0247809 -.0578388
(0.091) (0.032) (0.738) (0.373)
Arab (1=yes) -.225052 -.3571821 -.1986276 -.3288664
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) -.0526942 -.0652379 .005291 -.0058768
(0.339) (0.233) (0.885) (0.872)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 .066737 .1254853 .0244249 .0956851
(0.387) (0.036) (0.664) (0.022)
Constant -.2741347 .1163786 .0315953 .2077696
(0.071) (0.213) (0.770) (0.003)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 5988 18458 11384 28388
Pseudo-R
2 0.1139 0.1058 0.1159 0.1071
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
26Table 12: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. South-East
Europeans, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.0067578 -.0089353 -.0081165 -.0088257
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .1287258 .1901351 .1323039 .1819928
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) .2970494 -.0692595 -.1638511 -.2386762
(0.340) (0.737) (0.536) (0.150)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.6865043 -.5366974 -.4546826 -.4090453
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0024052 -.0023547 -.0023085 -.0023093
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) .2145171 .1861752 .0730765 .0930962
(0.002) (0.001) (0.210) (0.039)
No post-school training (1=yes) .1325172 .1051586 .0800368 .0747571
(0.000) (0.000) 0.002) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) -.3077265 -.2500064 -.0822161 -.1189525
(0.037) (0.039) (0.461) (0.186)
Arab (1=yes) -.0426397 -.1869798 -.0469251 -.1906975
(0.438) (0.000) (0.295) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0509357 .0503352 .0737853 .0658192
(0.172) (0.174) (0.022) (0.043)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.0358361 .0114755 -.0525679 .0238719
(0.587) (0.796) (0.327) (0.535)
Constant -.3470373 -.0400271 -.1971808 .0494407
(0.011) (0.640) (0.073) (0.485)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 9082 21548 12986 29796
Pseudo-R
2 0.1068 0.1071 0.1063 0.1043
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
27Table 13: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. South Ameri-
cans, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) .0048076 -.007966 -.0008486 -.0074929
(0.103) (0.000) (0.693) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .1153113 .2088441 .2049062 .2093702
(0.113) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) (dropped) -.3574509 (dropped) -.3111215
– (0.221) – (0.141)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.3518627 -.4378207 -.2853302 -.3366293
(0.176) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0020883 -.0022554 -.0020363 -.0022257
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) .1800687 .1882315 .0640619 .1135653
(0.040) (0.002) (0.368) (0.023)
No post-school training (1=yes) .2220273 .1150956 .1417823 .0789632
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) -.5012939 -.3865894 -.1684277 -.2004971
(0.004) (0.004) (0.181) (0.036)
Arab (1=yes) .2465087 .0352 -.123881 -.2372008
(0.092) (0.798) (0.250) (0.019)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .2606318 .2085986 .0275486 .0118806
(0.115) (0.200) (0.819) (0.920)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.2747318 -.1537532 -.0252241 .0716961
(0.114) (0.351) (0.844) (0.552)
Constant -1.265289 -.2768408 -.6210576 .0717586
(0.000) (0.095) (0.002) (0.564)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 3373 15835 5619 22730
Pseudo-R
2 0.1053 0.0995 0.1067 0.0983
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
28Table 14: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Africans, Pro-
bit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) .0083494 -.0069958 .0021719 -.0067725
(0.002) (0.000) (0.282) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .108949 .2090616 .167265 .2001379
(0.093) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) (dropped) -.3881262 (dropped) -.32513
(0.000) (0.186) – (0.125)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.4171082 -.4472925 -.2962135 -.3383029
(0.045) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0023963 -.0023242 -.0022337 -.0022752
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) .0353085 .0914122 .0215849 .0893174
(0.677) 0.131) (0.754) (0.069)
No post-school training (1=yes) .1799494 .1103697 .1283977 .0802572
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) -.1596119 -.1821415 .0017634 -.1123676
(0.352) (0.173) (0.989) (0.239)
Arab (1=yes) -.156152 -.29918 -.1465818 -.2437222
(0.052) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) -.0639466 -.0639876 -.0335807 -.0119869
(0.444) (0.441) (0.633) (0.864)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 .0746814 .1205997 .0456433 .0965171
(0.454) (0.163) (0.579) (0.186)
Constant -.7439443 .0660505 -.5355136 .0730931
(0.001) (0.561) (0.002) (0.435)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 4151 16622 6619 23731
Pseudo-R
2 0.1077 0.1024 0.1083 0.1002
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 16: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Germans, men
only, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.0067815 -.0067519 -.0067133 -.006644
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) -.3107498 -.3114969 -.3080738 -.3073083
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.473164 -.4741996 -.4765421 -.4725125
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0027454 -.002727 -.0027409 -.0027169
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) -.1115519 -.1109366 -.1117364 -.1090002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No post-school training (1=yes) -.1247243 -.1179297 -.1231723 -.1151352
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) .0577443 .0577123 .0583478 .0546378
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Arab (1=yes) -.0782519 -.1490908 -.0636556 -.13485
(0.100) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0867844 .0862298 .0876776 .0870229
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.0444255 -.0255927 -.033517 .0045567
(0.460) (0.377) (0.488) (0.854)
Constant .3089901 .3153376 .2952143 .3080499
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 230321 239314 225259 237248
Pseudo-R
2 0.1128 0.1129 0.1122 0.1122
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
31Table 17: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Germans, men
under 35 years of age only, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) .0336884 .0332375 .0343408 .0334436
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) -.0357475 -.0355259 -.0082751 -.0310851
(0.660) (0.659) (0.920) (0.701)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.3096844 -.3221038 -.3301904 -.3296402
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0027016 -.0026841 -.0027018 -.0026768
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) -.1303833 -.1294548 -.1293304 -.1277528
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No post-school training (1=yes) .049431 .0506671 .0518579 .0513178
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) .1659246 .1616187 .1612721 .1528086
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arab (1=yes) -.1452294 -.1549461 -.1784725 -.1633904
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0485992 .0479556 .0486717 .0480173
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.1133497 -.0217101 -.0270522 .0068511
(0.138) (0.534) (0.674) (0.823
Constant -.8832763 -.8390625 -.9131683 -.8403905
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 115640 121515 113112 120828
Pseudo-R
2 0.0841 0.0847 0.0842 0.0847
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
32Table 18: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Germans, 9/11
+/- 180 days, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.00777 -.0076635 -.0709242 -.0077779
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) -.0713187 -.0572794 -.0709242 -.0532087
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) -.4016193 -.4058264 -.3924498 -.3968105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.4757005 -.4795325 -.4685177 -.4747567
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0121556 -.0121058 -.0122026 -.0121247
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) -.0466205 -.0438431 -.0484179 -.0416879
(0.082) (0.100) (0.074) (0.120)
No post-school training (1=yes) -.1312166 -.1263878 -.1316159 -.1244752
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) .1080753 .1059727 .1137165 .1116572
(0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Arab (1=yes) -.1772682 -.2225008 -.1916928 -.2353553
(0.143) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0277309 .0269772 .027549 .0268672
(0.033) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 .0528074 .0945181 .0632985 .0886659
(0.746) (0.201) (0.621) (0.159)
Constant .4873811 .4892431 .5102151 .5215871
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 83212 85873 81479 85143
Pseudo-R
2 0.3059 0.3058 0.3070 0.3070
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
33Table 19: difference-in-differences-estimates: Arabs vs. Germans, 9/11
+/- 365 days, Probit regression
Dependent Variable = Exit into employment Nationality concept 1 Nationality concept 2
Variable narrow broad narrow broad
Age (years) -.0066282 -.00655 -.0066879 -.0065568
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male (1=yes) .0060917 .0150079 .007823 .0180995
(0.522) (0.110) (0.417) (0.055)
Disabled 30% (1=yes) -.4070554 -.4147203 -.3938586 -.4048411
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disabled 50% (1=yes) -.5160595 -.5142032 -.5222812 -.5185555
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment duration (days) -.0052755 -.0052556 -.0052688 -.0052391
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher secondary schooling (1=yes) -.0828678 -.0813386 -.0862104 -.0810604
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No post-school training (1=yes) -.1271313 -.1214887 -.1282572 -.120473
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Academic Training (1=yes) .0886196 .0879759 .0908466 .0867894
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arab (1=yes) -.176365 -.2579303 -.1392863 -.2366044
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Post 9/11 (1=Yes) .0294326 .0293221 .0298535 .0296676
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction Arab*Post 9/11 -.0391454 .0202493 -.0460141 .0381048
(0.659) (0.616) (0.515) (0.268)
Constant .3831798 .3737445 .3929199 .3841518
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional Dummies (11) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Occupation Dummies (32) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Observations 171569 177229 168064 175720
Pseudo-R
2 0.2099 0.2101 0.2098 0.2099
Sig. (Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, p-values calculated with robust standard-errors in parentheses. See text for
explanations and variable deﬁnitions.
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